Part 2: Who Gets Hurt and Why

A three-part series by Caroline Hegstrom | April 29, 2026


When the news says "farmers are hurting," it treats American agriculture as one group. It isn't. This is Part 2 of a three-part series tracing the fertilizer system. In Part 1, we followed the price of nitrogen from the natural gas that makes it, through the wholesale market in New Orleans, to the retail quote at the local elevator, and found a widening gap between wholesale and retail that raises serious questions about pricing. Today, we look at who in American agriculture actually feels this, and why the most exposed got there.


Not all farms need nitrogen.

The word "farmer" covers an enormous range of operations in the United States. A cattle rancher in Montana, a corn grower in Iowa, and an organic vegetable producer in Minnesota are all "farmers", but they have almost nothing in common when it comes to fertilizer exposure. Understanding who is actually affected by the current nitrogen price spike, and why, requires looking at American agriculture as the segmented system it actually is.

Livestock and hay operations make up about 52% of U.S. farms. They rely heavily on forage and manure and are largely insulated from global urea markets. When the news reports that "farmers" are being hurt by fertilizer prices, more than half of American farms are mostly outside that story.

Row croppers — corn, wheat, and soybean producers — make up about 32% of farms. These are the operations most dependent on nitrogen, and they're the ones at the center of the current pricing pressure.

Specialty and organic producers, the farms growing your fresh fruits and vegetables, represent about 16% of farms. This segment is increasingly sourcing from the compost and organic fertilizer market, which now accounts for over 4% of total fertilizer sales by volume. It's worth noting that compost and organic inputs serve this segment well but are not a one-to-one replacement for the synthetic nitrogen used in broad-acre corn and wheat production; the scale and nutrient concentration are fundamentally different. What matters here is that these farms operate in a completely separate input supply chain, disconnected from natural gas prices and Middle Eastern shipping lanes.


The 80% and the 20%.

Within that 32% of row croppers, the exposure isn't uniform either. The Minnesota Farm Bureau estimates that 80–85% of row crop producers in the region locked in their fertilizer prices months ago through fall-fill programs and early-season contracts. For those families, the current price spike is something they're watching on the news, not something showing up on their invoices.

The real pain sits with the 15–20% who are buying on the spot market right now at $858/ton for urea and $1,114/ton for anhydrous ammonia.

That raises a question that often comes with an implied judgment: why didn't they lock in earlier?


Because they couldn't.

This is the part of the story that requires more than a headline. American row crop farmers are entering their fourth consecutive year of negative or near-negative profit margins. Corn prices have been depressed. Input costs were already elevated before the war began. The National Corn Growers Association reports that many producers have exhausted their equity and borrowing power; they simply did not have the cash to prepurchase fertilizer last fall, even when prices were lower than they are today.

Others were waiting on Farmer Bridge Assistance payments from the federal government, payments that, when they arrived, covered roughly 10% of a farmer's total input costs. Some were working with lenders through January and February just to determine whether a 2026 crop was financially viable at all. Fertilizer dealers, sensing the risk, shortened their prepay windows, which compressed the decision timeline further. And fall fertilizer application was already down 20% from normal, not because farmers didn't want to apply, but because the math didn't work.

These families didn't fail to plan. They operate in a commodity system where they don't set the price they receive for their crop and can't account for input spikes they have no power to negotiate. They were caught between low commodity prices, tight credit, delayed government support, and input costs that were already historically unfavorable. And then, a war broke out.


It's not just fertilizer.

Nitrogen is the input making headlines, but it's not the only cost that's climbed.

Diesel fuel is now averaging $5.40 per gallon nationwide, up from roughly $3.80–$3.90 before the conflict, and more than 50% higher than this time last year. Unlike nitrogen, diesel offers no domestic insulation. The U.S. still imports about 6.2 million barrels of crude oil per day, and because oil is priced on a global market, every farmer in America is paying the Strait of Hormuz premium at the pump. At $6/gallon, fuel costs per acre roughly double compared to $3/gallon. For a 500-acre corn and soybean operation, that's an additional $4,500 in fuel costs alone, before a single bag of fertilizer is purchased.

The distinction that matters: nitrogen is where the U.S. has the strongest domestic position. We produce roughly 90% of our own supply from domestic natural gas. On the input at the center of this specific crisis, we are largely self-sufficient. The questions aren't about whether we have enough; they're about how it's being priced between the wholesale market and the farm gate, and why that gap keeps widening.


The compound effect.

What makes this moment so difficult for that 15–20% isn't any single cost increase. It's the compound effect. Fertilizer up 49% year-over-year. Diesel up more than 50%. Commodity prices that don't cover production costs. Farm debt at a record high. And a planting window that doesn't wait for markets to settle.

In concrete terms, University of Illinois researchers estimate that the fertilizer price increases alone are adding $30 to $55 per acre in nitrogen costs, equivalent to 7 to 13 bushels of corn per acre that a farmer must grow just to cover the increase, before earning anything.

A farmer standing in a field in April 2026 is absorbing all of these costs simultaneously, with no guarantee that the price they receive for their crop at harvest will cover what they spent to grow it. That's the reality behind the headline.

In Part 3, we'll follow the food dollar from the farm gate to the grocery store, because when food prices go up and someone points to fertilizer as the reason, the math tells a different story.


Sources referenced in this article:

  • DTN Retail Fertilizer Trends (April 22, 2026): National average retail urea and anhydrous prices
  • NCGA / AgWeb / DTN (March 2026): Frostic and Hunt on farmer exposure, cash flow, and delayed purchases
  • Minnesota Farm Bureau / MPR News (March 30, 2026): Glessing on 80–85% lock-in rate
  • USDA ERS (2026): Farm Sector Income Forecast
  • EIA (April 21, 2026): National diesel price data
  • farmdoc daily, University of Illinois (April 26, 2026): Per-acre nitrogen cost impact
  • AGDAILY / Wisconsin Farmer (April 2026): Per-acre diesel cost analysis
  • USDA (2026): Farm type breakdown and fertilizer market segmentation

This is Part 2 of a three-part series. Part 1: From Natural Gas to the Elevator. Part 3: Follow the Food Dollar.

Caroline Hegstrom is the founder of Taiga Farm & Seed and The Boreal Farm, a certified organic farm in Northern Minnesota.

Caroline Hegstrom